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----------00000---------REPLY TO RESPONDENT NELSONS STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents Nelsons claim that Appellants acquiesced in the
escrow agreement is irlf::orrect.

Even though Appellants accepted

checks from the escrow company in payment of the surns due under
the Uniform Real Estate Contract they continually looked to the
Austins

(the original purchasers) as the persons responsible to

make pavments called for under the Contract IR-171).

With this

Appellants aqree with Respondents' Statement of Facts.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NOTICES OF DEFAULT RECEIVED BY AUSTINS WF.PE
SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE APPELLANTS TO EXERCISE
THEIR OPTION UNDER PARAGRAPH 16C OF TPE CONTRACT

The only Frief filed by Respondents in this matter has been
filed by the Nelsons, who are not parties to the
F.state Contract with the Appellants.

Peal

Respondents Nelsons

that notice of default need only be given to those with whom
seller is in privity of contract.

The uncontroverted evidence

before this Court, as contained in the Affidavit of Richard M.
Johnston, states that:
I have personally consulted with the Defendant
Virginia Ann Austin in reqilrd to why her June 15, 1987,
payment had not been made on time.
Two of these
conversations were in my home, and at all times I
informed her that,
regardless of any extenuating
circumstances with her escrow company, that we were not
a party to any escrow agreement; that we were required
to make our underlying mortgage payment;
that we
expected payment in full; and that any payments made
outside the thirty-day grace period (as provided for in
the Contract) would not be tolerated.
(R-171)
The record indicates that the

admitted receiving

such notice (R-155).
Over thirty-days elapsed after Austins had received the
notice from the Appellants that they were in default before
Appellants exercised their rights under Paragraph 16C

the

Contract (R-272).
This Court has, on many occasions, reviewed the nefault
provisions in real estate contracts.

Bowever, this Court has

never held that written notice must be given to the defaulting
party before the seller can exercise the remedies available under
the Contract.

It is only necessnry that:

. . . some affirmative act on the part of the seller is
required to notifv the huver what he must do to brina
the Contract current.
First Securitv Pank of Utah v.

2

MaXWP.11, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah,
'.:.-'-;·-=""°"M'"'a_r_w_i_c_k__D_e_v_.,_.l_o_._p_M_e_n_t_,,__I_n_c-'-. , 6 21
1°8 0) .

1983) citing Grow
P.2d 1249
(Utah,

!n this case, there were five separate affirmative acts by
the sellers giving the Buyers notice of their default and what
was necessary to cure it

(R-222).

This Court has never concerned itself with the distinction
hetween written notice or actual noticP given in connection with
a

of a contract purchaser.

Rather the concern has been

whether or not the purchasers knew what was expected of them.
concern is not present in this case.

It is clear that the

Austins did know exactly what was expected of them to bring the
pavments current.

They were notified the amounts due and the

months in which payments were not received.
Respondents' reliance on LaMont v. F.vjen, 29 Ut.2d 266, 508
P.2d 537

(1973), is misplaced.

In that case, the Court found

that the seller had failed to properly notifv the buyer of a
pavment which had been missed over a vear before.

Further, the

sellers had failed to give notice of their election to treat the
cnntract as a note and mortgage prior to buyers tendering the
;imrrnnts due.

In this case, the Buyers

two consecutive

p;ivments and were notified five separate times by the Sellers of
the defaults before sending written notice of Sellers' election
to accelerate on July 19, 1982.
tenrlPr of

In spite of that notice, no

amount was made until twenty-eight days after

3

The P.espondents also rely on Hansen v. Christensen, 545

P.oa

1152 (Utah, 1976), for the proposition that provisions of a real
estate contract are not self-executing.

The ?espondents mis-

takenly read into the language in Hansen, supra, that written
notice is the only affirmative act of seller that will satisfy
the notice requirement.

In Hansen, supra, this Court was con-

cerned that a defaulting buyer would not know what to do unless
it received notice of the seller's intentions.
case here.

Such is not thP

It is undisputed that the Austins were clearly told

that the Appellants expected the paymerits he brought current
within the thirty-day grace period (R-171).

Furthermore, the

tender of the back payments in Hansen, supra, was made prior to
any exercise of sellers' options under the contract.
1154.

Id. at

That likewise is not the case here.
The Respondents' reliance on First Securitv Bank of Utah v.

Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah, 1983); Grow v. Marwick Development
Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah, 1980); Call v. Timber Lakes Corp., 567
P.2d 1108 (Utah, 1977); Fuhriman v. Bissegger, 13 Utah 20 379,
375 P.2d 27

(1962); LaMont v. Evjen, /9 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532

(1973); and Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 699

(1934) is

likewise misplaced in that each of those cases deal with the
forfeiture provisions of Paragraph 16A of the Contract.

The cae

at hand deals with Paragraph 16C, the mortgage foreclosure
provisions.

Paragraph 16A of the Contract, by its terms, re-

quires a five-day written notice to buvers to remedy a defau't
before a forfeiture can be declared unljke Paragraph 16C which

4

the seller the right
t<'

"at his option and upon written notice

•lie buver" to oeclaJ:"e the entire amount: due and payable if the

buvers' default is not cured within the thirty-dav period
prnvided by the contract.

In this case, the notice of election

to accelerate was given to the Buyers on July 19, 1982, and,
consequently, Sellers have fulfilled all of their obligations to
notify under the Contract.
The Appellants' actions were anequate and appropriate to
notify the Austins of their default and Austins could have cured
the default within the thirty-dav period provided for in the
Contract.

By their failure to do so, the Appellants were justi-

fied in the exercise of their option under Paragraph 16C of the
contract by treatinq it as a mortgage and accelerating the
due and owing.

POINT II
THERE IS NO PEQUIREMENT TFAT A PERIOD OF TIME BE
ALLOWED FOR THF Cl':RE OF DEFAULT ONCE THE tTNIFORM REAL
ESTATE
IS DECLARED TO BF A MORTGAGE
ThP Respon<lents request this Court to impose a second period
of time in which to allow defaulting buyers to cure defaults
under a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Succinctly put, Respon-

dents' urge the proposition that sellers must wait a reasonable
time for buyers to cure a default after notice then wait a second
pPriod of time for buvers to remedy after sellers make an electn treat the Contract as a mortgage.

The law in the State

'·' r·ta'i is clear that under a mortgage there is nn requirement to

5

either notify or give a reasonable time to cure a default.
Th(lmas v. Foulger, 71 Ute>h 274, 764 P. 975

In

(1<:128), this Court

stated in a mortqage foreclosure proceec'\ing that:
According to the great weight of authority, when a note
contains a provision accelerating the date of maturitv
if the interest is not paid when due, the holder of
such note is not required to give notice (lf an election
to declare the note due as a condition precedent to
bringing an action to its collection.
Id. at 978.
This principle was affirMec'\ in Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 Ut.2ct 111,
378 P.2d 355 (1963), where e> third party guarantor cli'limed that
the mortgagee should give him notice of the mortgagor's default
prior to acceleration.

This Court stated that, on the contrary,

notice of default was not required to be given to the guaraDtor
and that a foreclosure action was proper without giving furthPr
notice or right to cure.

Id. at 357.

Citing Themas, supra, with approval, this Court,
cial Security Bank v. Corporation Nine, 600 P.2d 1000 (Utah,
1979), determined what notice requirements were applicable under
a mortgage note acceleration clause, and stated:
A complaint for the unpaid balance of an installment:
note is a sufficient declaration bv the pavee for
purposes cf enforcing an acceleration clause of the
kind under consideration, 'T'horoas v. Foulger, 71 Utah
274, 264 P. 975 (1928).
Id. at 1002.
Once the Appellants in this case validly accelerated the
Contract and elected to treat it as a mortgage and notified the
Austins accordingly, no additional time was available to the
Austins to brinq the hack payments current.

The Respondents are,

in effect, asking that a ser•oDd pP:i:-ioc1. of time he gi"Pn

6

pure h as ers
- · to cure their default after a proper acceleration has
bePn

This position is not supported by the law and if

approved by this Court would place a hardship not only upon the
Appellants but on all mortgagees and would impose a condition
which was not agreed upon by the Appellants.

The integrity of

the contract should be upheld and Appellants should be allowed to
proceed with the foreclosure of the subject property.

The Trial

court's summaq• iudgment should be re,,ersed.

CONCLUSION
The principle in this case, simply stated, involves nothing
more than the form of notice of default that is required to be
given under a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

It is clear that the

Appellants have taken the affirmative actions necessary to notify
Respondents Austins that they were in default, the amount that
was required to be paid to bring the Contract current, and that
performance was expected within the thirty-day grace period
crovided for under the Contract.

At no time have the Austins,

the actual parties to the Contract, ever raised the issue that
thev were unaware of what was required by them to bring the
Contract current.
Once buyers in default under a Contract have been given
notice to remedy the default by the Sellers and they fail to do
so within the time permitted under the Contract, the Sellers then
the riqht to treat the Contract as a note and rnor':.gage bv
·rctic··'.nq the Buyers in writing of this election.

7

Ruvers attempt

to remedy the delinquencies after receipt of notice of SellPrs
election to accelerate is ineffectual to reinstate Ruvers to
Contract position they held prior to their default.

To hold

otherwise unjustly infringes on the rights for which the Sellers
contracted.
Consequently, the Trial Court's orders granting Respondents'
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed and Appellants'
Motion for Summary Judgment to foreclose the property shouln be
granted and this matter should be remanded for entry of a Decree
of Foreclosure and a determination of an amount of attorney's
fees for which the Appellants are entitled.
DATED this

day of January, 1984.
GUSTIN, JIJ)AMS, KASTING

&

I,IAPIS

F'RANKJ:cifSTIN
MAILING CERTIF!CATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foreqoinq Appellants' Replv Brief were mailed, postaqe pre-paid,
to:
JAMES T. DUNN, ESQ.
Suite 315
1225 East Fort Union Boulevard
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Boyd E. and Barbara L. Nelson;
KIM R. WILSON, ESQ.
1100 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake ritv, Utah 84111
Attnrnev
John Franks;
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LLOYD H. AND VIRGINIA AUSTIV
831 West 3900 South
Bountiful, Utah ?4010
Attorneys pro se;
INCOME REALTY AND MORTGAGE, INC.
c/o Secretary of State
Reher M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111;
DAVID J. AND RUTH ANN ISBET.L
692 North 700 East
Centerville, Utah 84014,
nay of January, 1984.
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(iii)

ISSUE ON APPEAL
Can plaintiffs avoid their contractual requirement to
issue stock in a new corporation by an early repayment of a
separate obligation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs (Spors) below brought an action for recision
and for a declaratory judgment relieving them of any responsibility under a pre-incorporation contract.

Defendant (Crested

Butte) counterclaimed for breach of contract and specific performance of the plaintiffs' obligation to issue shares in the new
corporation to defendant.

Defendant also implead as a third-party

defendant Candelaria Metals, Inc. (Candelaria), to release mineral
properties covered by the pre-incorporation contract which it
had contracted to lease from plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiffs and third-party defendant based upon an alleged accord
and satisfaction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant prays that the case be remanded for jury trial
on the merits, and for its costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In mid-1979, the Spors approached Crested Butte's chairman,
John Larsen, explaining that the Spors held certain mining claims
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which they wished to exploit, but were unable to do so themselves
(Larsen depo. at 4-5; Chad Spor depo at 8-10).

As stated by

Daniel Svilar, Crested Butte's general counsel:
"They were out of work and I don't think
Paul had received a check for some time
and they were in financial straits,
and he [John Larsen] was trying to help
them, you know, have a paycheck coming
in and get them going and felt that
initially if the money was advanced
to them, that eventually Gold Spor could
go public . . . " (Svilar depo. at 10).
After some negotiation, an "AGREEMENT TO INCORPORATE"
(hereinafter "pre-incorporation contract") dated July 30, 1979
(R.177-182) was executed between Crested Butte and the Spors
whereby a new corporation, Gold Spor Mining Company (Gold

Spor),

would be formed, in which the parties would share control (Chad
Spor depo. at 14).

The new corporation would accept contributioru

of property from both parties.

Each party was to be issued

one million shares of stock in Gold Spor (Depo. Exh. D-1 at
2-3), and the Board of Directors was to consist of Chad, Paul
and Ray Spor and, as representatives of Crested Butte, Max Evans
and Harold Herron.
In payment for the one million shares issues to them,
respectively, the Spors were to transfer all of their mining
claims and leaseholds and certain small mining equipment to
the new corporaticn (Depo. Exh. D-1, Exh. "A" thereto - Articles
of Incorporation), Crested Butte was to transfer and assign

-2-

to Gold Spor a certain flotation plant known as the "peanut
mill" and to acquire for Gold Spor a heavy media sink-float
plant (hereinafter "heavy media plant") (_!i. at 2; Chad Spor
depo. at 14).
In addition, and independent from the contribution of
the peanut mill and heavy media plant, Crested Butte was obligated
to loan to Gold Spor up to $150,000.

The loan was to provide

the Spor family with income and to pay for certain incidental
operating expenses incurred by Gold Spor.

It was to be evidenced

by a promissory note and secured by Gold Spor pledging up to
200,000 shares of its stock on a pro-rata basis (Larsen depo.

at 35).
The Spors visited the peanut mill just outside Crested
Butte, Colorado in early August 1979 and found it to be suitable
for processing fluorspar ore of the type found on the subject
mining properties (Ray Spor depo. at 4-5).

It was the expressed

intention of the Spors to transfer the peanut mill to a site
in Beaver County, Utah within 45 days of the July 30, 1979 agreement, due to the approach of winter (_!i.).

Crested Butte approved

transfer of the mill to Gold Spor, but it was never taken to
Utah for reasons which are in dispute (Ray Spor depo. at 25-26;
Larsen depo. at 38-40).
Also in August 1979, both the Spors and Crested Butte
began efforts to locate a suitable heavy media plant, even though

-3-

it is undisputed that the responsibility for locating and transporting the heavy media plant was the Spars', whereas Crested
Butte's obligation was only to pay for it (Ray Spor depo. at
46-47).

In September 1979 the Spors purchased a

"skeleton" of a fifty-tons per hour capacity heavy media plant
in Bouse, Arizona (R.66; Depo. Exh. P-12; Chad Spor depo. at
71).

This plant was transported to Del ta, Utah, where the Spors

would complete it, if a suitable heavy media plant could not
be located (Ray Spor depo. at 11).

From September 1980 through

December 1980, the Spors reported to Crested Butte that they
were searching for components to complete the heavy media plant
(Depo. Exh. 6).

For reasons which are likewise in dispute,

a heavy media plant was never purchased, nor was the skeleton
heavy media plant ever completed.
On February 19, 1980, without notifying Crested Butte
or directors Evans and Herron, and without action by Gold Spor's
board of directors, the Spors issued one million shares of stock
to themselves and their relatives.

No stock in Gold Spor was,

or ever has been issued to Crested Butte (Chad Spor depo. at
31).

Further, the Spors failed to execute a promissory note

and failed to pledge stock as security for the $125,000.00 that
Crested Butte had loaned to Gold Spor between July 1979 and
March 1980 (Chad Spor depo. at 32).
Unknown to Crested Butte, in March of 1980, Paul Spor,
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vice president and director of Gold Spor, was employed by Candelaria
(R.312); and following his employ by Candelaria, Gold Spor began
to sell off some of its properties to Candelaria.

At some time

between March and July of 1980, Paul Spor became vice president
and general manager of Candelaria (R.307); and at the time of
his deposition was also a director of Candelaria (Paul Spor
depo. at 3-4).

Only after the commencement of discovery in

this action did Crested Butte learn of Paul Spor's positions
with Candelaria.
On May 2, 1980, the Spors mailed an ineffectual notice
of a special board meeting of Gold Spor's board of directors
to Messrs. Evans and Herron of Crested Butte in Riverton, Wyoming,
indicating that the meeting would be held in Salt Lake City
on May 3, 1980, and that Gold Spor's board would consider a
proposal to sell Gold Spor's properties in Esmarelda County,
Nevada to Candelaria.

(Discovery later revealed that the Spors

had already (on April 22, 1980) received a $10,000 royalty payment
from Candelaria, and that by October 15, 1982, the Spors had
received $290,000 in royalties and $56,500 for equipment rental
from Candelaria).

[R.310].

The notice, undoubtedly as designed,

was not received until the day of the meeting and, consequently,
no representative of Crested Butte was present.
"A"

attached.

See, Exhibit

(R.76, No. 4).

At the May 3, 1980 board meeting, the Spors, purporting
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to act as Gold Spor's board, adopted by-laws for the corporati%
and approved a letter of understanding with Candelaria, which
was finally executed on May 26, 1980 (Depo. Exh. D-8).

No notice

of this action was given to Crested Butte or its representatives
on the board of Gold Spor.

Also, without the knowledge of or

notice to Crested Butte, further negotiations were had between
the Spors and Candelaria with regard to the leasing of all mining
properties of Gold Spor (Paul Spor Depo. at 17-18).
On August 12, 1980 Crested Butte received mailed notice
of a special board meeting of Gold Spor to be held on August
18, 1980 in Salt Lake City.

The notice simply stated that the

board would "transact any and all matters which may come before
the meeting" (R. 259).

Crested Butte's representatives on Gold

Spor' s Board could not attend, since Max Evans was in the hospita1
and Harold Herron was out of town (Larsen depo. at 52; Evan
depo. at 57).

Consequently, John Larsen and Daniel Svilar,

Crested Butte's general counsel, flew to Salt Lake City on August
18, 1980 to obtain information and to attempt to repair the
now-evident rift between the Spors and Crested Butte (Larsen
depo. at 51).

The Spors barred Messrs. Larsen and Svilar from

the board meeting and the contemporanious stockholders meeting
(Larsen depo. at 54), even though Crested Butte had a legal
right to 1,000,000 shares of stock, which had not been issued
to it.
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While the meetings were going on, Chad Spor and his counsel
met with Mr. Larsen and Mr. Svilar (Svilar depo. at 28-30).
Spor refused to relate what was happening or any of the
details of the Spors' arrangement with Candelaria and stated
that Crested Butte was to have no further role in Gold Spor

(.!.2,· at 28).

He accused Crested Butte of breaching the pre-incor-

poration contract and stated the agreements between Crested
Butte and the Spors were at an end (.!!!,. at 29).

Messrs. Svilar

and Larsen denied any breach of the agreement by Crested Butte
and demanded that the security stock be issued to Crested Butte,
or that its loan to Gold Spor, then totalling $125,000, be repaid
immediately as a pre-condition to any settlement by Crested
Butte of its rights under the pre-incorporation contract (Larsen
depo. at 77).

This demand was refused by Mr. Spor (Svilar depo.

at 31).
Upon returning to Riverton, Mr. Svilar confirmed the
substance of the meeting by a letter of August 21, 1980 (Depo.
Exh. 18), which denied any breach of the agreement by Crested
Butte nor any waiver of Crested Butte's rights.

Mr. Svilar

went on to say:
"We would appreciate rece1v1ng the promissory notes with the pledged stock forthwith as required under Section III of
the Agreement to Incorporate. We are
also awaiting a response regarding our
final offer on the prepayment of the
loan."
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The Spors responded by a letter dated September 15, 1980 from
Richard Lawrence, the Spors counsel, along with a check representing the accrued interest on the loan from Crested Butte
to Gold Spor, and an offer to pay $5,000 per month to repay
the entire loan by April 1, 1981 (Depo. Exh. 19).

By letter

of August 6, 1980 Max Evans responded to Mr. Lawrence's letter
and the tender of the check stating that:
"Please be advised that we reject this
tender as not being in accordance with
what was discussed in Salt Lake City
on August 18, 1980. Unless full payment
is made forthwith in accordance with
the offer made to you on August 18,
1980 I would suggest that we make one
more effort at resolving this matter
amicably. . " (Depo. Exh. 20).
Despite repeated statements by Crested Butte that the
Spors were not in accordance with Crested Butte's offer calling
for immediate repayment of the loan (Depo. Ex. P-20), the Spars
continued sending installment checks to Crested Butte (Depa.
Ex. P-21).

The checks were held and n9t cashed.

The final

check was sent by the Spors on June 19, 1981 (Dep. Exh. P-31).
Thereafter, on advice of its Wyoming counsel, Crested Butte
cashed the checks received from the Spors.

The Spors then

the instant action for a declaratory judgment to release them
from their obligations under the pre-incorporation contract
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(R.1-6).

Crested Butte counterclaimed for specific performance

of the Spors' obligation to issue shares in Gold Spor to Crested
Butte, and for a declaration of its rights under the contract
(R.36-44).

After discovery in this action revealed the unscrupu-

lous methods employed by the Spors to oust Crested Butte in
the affairs of Gold Spor, and of Paul Spor's duplicitous relationship with Candelaria, Crested Butte implead Candelaria to insure
a complete ajudication of its rights under the pre-incorporation
contract.
ARGUMENT
Crested Butte has faithfully performed all of its obligations under the pre-incorporation contract, whereas the Spors,
themselves, have breached the contract by failing to issue the
one million shares of stock of Gold Spor to Crested Butte, and
in failing to move the peanut mill and in failing to complete
the heavy media plant.

Further, the Spors unlawfully frus-

trated the entire purpose of the pre-incorporation contract
by entering into leases with Candelaria and by fraudulently

concealing from Crested Butte the unprincipled relationship
between themselves and Candelaria.

By deceit and falsehood

the Spars "froze out" Crested Butte from the corporate affairs
of Gold Spor and then proceeded to engineer a unilateral "recision"
of the contract, which was the basis of their motion for the
summary judgment granted by the lower court.
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For the following

reasons, Crested Butte prays that said judgment be reversed
and the case remanded for trial on the merits.
POINT I.
A QUESTION OF FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER
CRESTED BUTTE'S ACCEPTANCE OF EARLY
REPAYMENT OF THE LOAN CONSTITUTED A
RECISION OR AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
OF THE ENTIRE PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACT.
In its memorandum decision, the trial court found, as
a matter of law, that by retaining and eventually cashing the
checks which constituted repayment of the loan from Crested
Butte to Gold Spor, Crested Butte had accepted an "offer of
recision."

Appellant contends that there is a factual dispute

as to whether or not an accord and satisfaction occurred between
the parties rescinding the pre-incorporation contract and that
the lower court erred in finding such as a matter of law.
Upon receipt of a notice of a meeting of the Board of
Directors of Gold Spor, which was to be held on August 18, 1980,
Crested Butte's representatives on Gold Spor' s Board were ind is·
posed and unable to attend the meeting.

However, John Larsen,

Crested Butte's chairman, and D. P. Svilar, its corporate counsel
flew to Salt Lake City to attend the August 18 board meeting
only to be barred from the meeting and the shareholders' meeting
which was held immediately thereafter.

At that time, discussions

were had between Messrs. Larsen and Svilar, representing
Butte, and Chad Spor and his counsel, Mr. Lawrence.
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The substanlc

of these discussions is in clear dispute.

The evidence is con-

flicting as to whether an offer to rescind was ever made.

The

testimony of Daniel Svilar is that Crested Butte demanded immediate payment, not as a term of settlement, but as a precondition
of settlement.

(Deposition of Daniel Svilar at 31).

The perform-

ance by the Spors would settle only the issue of the unsecured
wd unevidenced loan.

"A. The final offer, as I recall, says
that if Mr. Spor could get all of the
money and pay Crested Butte off, that
would resolve that part of the issue.

Q.

What part of the issue?

A. The issue on the note and the security
of the stock and I assumed that the
whole thing could probably be resolved.

Q.

Including a possibility that if
the amount was entirely repaid, that
perhaps the entire agreement to incorporate could also be rescinded in connection
with that?
A. That possibility existed because
-- of course, we didn't know what the
terms of the agreement were at that
time and it would have been rather difficult to go to the Board of Directors
with an offer without knowing what was
going on in the company." l!!_. at 47.

Subsequently, Mr. Lawrence sent a check with a cover
letter of September 15, 1980 to Crested Butte, declaring the
Spors intention to repay the $125,000.00 loan in full on or
before April 1, 1981 (Exhibit P-19).

On October 6, 1980, Mr.

Evans wrote back to Mr. Lawrence stating that the tender was
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rejected as not being in conformance with the discussions in
Salt Lake City.

However, Mr. Larsen did offer to meet with

the Spors to work out the parties' differences (Exhibit P-20).
Despite this, Mr. Lawrence wrote back stating that the Spors
would continue to pay (Exhibit P-23).
Messrs. Larsen and Svilar were discussing the then very
evident rift between Crested Butte and the Spors while standing
in a vertual factual vacuum.

They had been barred from the

board meeting and the Spors would tell them nothing about the
agreement with Candelaria.

Crested Butte was in the position

of having made an unsecured loan, not even evidenced by a promis·
sory note, to a group of people its officers had trusted, but
who now gave strong indication they had breached that trust.
Crested Butte's primary concern at that point was the $125,000
it had loaned to Gold Spor.

Had the contract been honored by

the Spors, that amount would have been evidenced by a promissory note in that amount from Gold Spor and it would have been
secured by 166,666 shares of Gold Spor stock as provided by
Section III of the Agreement to Incorporate (R.179).

As it

was, Crested Butte had neither, to say nothing of its right
to 1,000,000 shares of Gold Spor stock as provided by Section
I(b) of the contract (R.178).
The Spors also contend that Crested Butte's eventual
cashing of the repayment checks constituted an "accord and sat is·
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faction·

This too must fail.

Plaintiffs contend that Crested

Butte should have returned the checks instead of retaining and
eventually cashing them, lest Crested Butte waive its other
rights under the contract.

Yet, it was clear that the plaintiffs

had already breached the contract by failing to evidence or
secure the loan.
The loan was a "liquidated" obligation.

The exact amount

owing could be ascertained by merely computing the principal
and interest due at any point in time.

Crested Butte's acceptance

of payment of the "liquidated" loan obligation did not work
an accord and satisfaction of its separate "unliquidated" claim
for a 50% interest in Gold Spor.

No consideration was given

to Crested Butte for its alleged abandonment of its interest
in Gold Spor, since the Spors gave nothing in addition to repayment of the loan, which they were obligated to do irrespective of Crested Butte's other claim for a 50% interest in Gold
Spor.

As noted in Allen-Hollie Specialities Corp. v. U.S. Construe-

tion, Inc., 611 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980):
. . The payment of a part of a debt
(in situations such as the one at hand),
does not discharge it, even though the
debtor exacts a promise that it will
do so. The debtor, by making part payment
is doing nothing more than he is legally
obligated to do; and, therefore, he
gives the creditor no consideration
for the promise that part payment will
be accepted to discharge the entire
debt." :rd. o...+ //0.
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In that case, the subcontractor plaintiff had accepted several
progress payment checks which contained endorsements acknowledgini
payment in full for work performed to date.

The court held

that the contract showed that there was to be one consideration
for the entire job and that progress payments were merely payment
"on account."

As in that case, a review of the contract in

this case indicates that the repayment of the loan was only
one of several respective obligations of the parties to the
contract.

Plaintiffs' satisfaction of one "liquidated" obligatiot

under the contract is without consideration to satisfy any other
obligations they may have under the contract, which can be deter·
mined only by a trial on the merits of such other issues.
The proposal made by Crested Butte at the August 18,
1980 meeting called for full and immediate repayment of the
principal and interest due on the loan as a prerequisite to
any further negotiation of Crested Butte's interest under the
contract.

Gold Spor did not comply.

Instead, the Spors made

repayments in small increments over many months, the final payment
being made on June 19, 1981.

As early as October 17, 1980,

Max Evans had informed the Spors' attorney that their oral agree·
ment had called for immediate repayment, that the Spors had
not complied and that Crested Butte considered the pre-incorpora·
tion contract in force (Depo. Exh. 22).

Any tender of payments

by Gold Spor after that date were made at the Spors' peril.
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It is interesting to note that nowhere in the correspondence in the record, cited at length by plaintiffs, is it stated
by the Spors or their representatives that the tender of the

checks is conditioned-upon total recision of all aspects of
the contract (Depo. Exhs. 18-31).

Indeed, the endorsement on

the back of the check of March 30, 19811/ in the amount of
$50,339.49 has the following notation:

"This check is the final installment
representing payment in full of the
principal and interest owing on the
$125,000 loan by Crested Butte Silver
Mining, Inc. to Gold Spor Mining Company
under Section III of the Agreement to
Incorporate between Crested Butte and
Chad A. Spor, Ray Spor, Paul Spor, Spor
Brothers Motor Company and Spors, Inc.
dated July 30, 1978."
It says nothing more than that the loan has been repaid, not
that the Agreement to Incorporate has been cancelled.

In fact,

it refers only to one part of the Agreement--Section III, which
plaintiff Chad Spor testified most emphatically was an obligation
entirely separate from the other provisions of the pre-incorporation agreement (Chad Spor Depo. at 26-27).

A logical conclusion,

and one which cannot be ruled out as a matter of law, is that
the remaining portions of the agreement are still in effect,
and no meeting of minds toward a contrary intent has been shown.

1.

At the time it was issued, Gold Spor considered this check
However, it was later
discovered that the first check sent to Crested Butte had been
roided. Therefore, the check of June 19, 1981 was then issued
and became the final repayment. (Dep. Exh. P-31).

t? be the final repayment of the loan.
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Obviously, there is a factual dispute as to the terms
of the oral agreement of August 18, 1980, if there was an agreement, and of the intent of the parties regarding the repayment
of the loan.

The burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to show

so convincingly that reasonable minds could not differ that
the parties at the time of the August 18, 1980 conversation
intended to rescind the entire pre-incorporation contract.
"[T]he party availing himself of a plea
of accord and satisfaction must bear
the burden of proof and must establish
clearly that there was a meeting of
the minds of the parties accompanied
by a sufficient consideration." Walden
v. Backus, 408 P.2d 712, 714 (Nev. 1965)
(emphasis in original).
Construing all of the facts of record in the 1 ight most favorable
to defendant, the plaintiffs have not shown that there was a
"meeting of the minds" to cancel the pre-incorporation contract.
If, as has been testified by Messrs. Evans and Larsen, the offer

made by Crested Butte at the August 18, 1980 meeting was that
repayment was a pre-condition to negotiations for ending the
contract between the parties, then plaintiffs cannot change
the substance of that agreement by later claiming that their
understanding of it was different.

If repayment of the loan

was only to settle that separate and distinct obligation in
the contract, and leave further negotiations open, then those
further issues must be submitted to the finder of fact.
In Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 11'
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417 P.2d 761 (1966), the plaintiff was hired as a salesman by
defendant under an employment contract providing for payment
of commissions and a covenant that plaintiff would not compete
with defendant's business within six months of termination of
plaintiff's employment.

When the contract was terminated by

defendant, plaintiff was paid his back salary, but defendant
refused to pay for additional commissions for sales allegedly
made by plaintiff prior to the termination.

Subsequently, plain-

tiff was employed by one of defendant's competitors, contrary
to the covenant not to compete.

Plaintiff filed suit seeking

the amount of unpaid commissions and the trial court entered
judgment in plaintiff's favor.
On appeal, defendant argued that since plaintiff had,
prior to filing the action, retained and cashed a check from
defendant which contained a limited endorsement which stated
"Payment in full of the account stated below--Endorsement of
check by payee is sufficient receipt" effected an accord and
satisfaction of all of plaintiff's claims.

In affirming judgment

for plaintiff, this Court stated:
"We have no disagreement with the proposition generally that where there is
a dispute about a claim and one party
makes an offer of settlement which is
accepted and performed by the other,
that constitutes an accord and satisfaction of the claim. But that rule does
not govern under the particular facts
of this case. Plaintiff testified that
upon receipt of the check he went to
the defendants and discussed the matter,
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telling them that he did not regard
it as payment in full and the dispute
between the parties over the matter
is what precipitated this lawsuit.
He was unguestionably entitled to the
money he did receive; and the dispute
was as to whether he had more coming.
The dispute negates any accord; and
under the facts found by the trial court
the plaintiff could not equitably be
precluded from asserting his further
claim." li_. at 764-65.
(Emphasis added).
As in Bennett, supra, it is undisputed that Crested Butte
was entitled to repayment of the $125,000 loan.

The dispute

is whether Crested Butte in receiving what it was clearly entitlei
to receive, agreed to give up its rights to the main purpose
of the pre-incorporation contract, to-wit:

the opportunity

to share in the possible future profits of the Gold Spor corpora·
tion.
The existence and validity of an accord and satisfaction
is a question of fact to be determined from all the evidence.
French v. Southeby & Co., 470 P.2d 318 (Okla. 1970).

In this

case, it remains a material issue of fact whether or not the
pre-incorporation contract was rescinded and whether an accord
and satisfaction of the dispute between the parties was ever
reached.
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POINT II.
ANY ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN
THE PARTIES WAS VITIATED BY THE SPORS'
FRAUD.
Even conceding arguendo that the pre-incorporation contract
was rescinded, either expressly or by acquiescence, any such
agreement or settlement was rendered unenforceable by fraud.
Just as in the case of any other contract, an accord and satisfaction which is tainted by fraud is voidable.
"It is well settled that an agreement
in settlement of a dispute which is
based upon fraud by one party does not
operate as an accord and satisfaction."
Studiengesellschaft Kahle mbH v. Novamont
Corp., et al., 485 F.Supp. 471, 475
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Further,
"It has been held that fraud vitiates
whatever it touches including final
judgments and final orders as well as
contracts." Prather v. Colorado Oil
& Gas Corp., 542 P.2d 297, 304 (Kan.
1975).
See also, Martin v. Alco-Deree Co., 216 F.Supp. 253 (D. Ill.
1963); 6 Corbin On Contracts, §1292 at 178 (1962 ed.).

A fraud may be committed by the suppression of the truth
as well as by an affirmative, false statement.

A duty to disclose

the truth may arise from a relationship of trust or confidence,
inequality of knowledge or other circumstances.
14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963).
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Elder v. Clawson,

See also, Sugarhouse Finance

v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980).
Fraud may be proved either by showing actuai intent to
mislead, or through the breach of a fiduciary duty.
"Fraud is classified under two major
headings, actual and constructive.
The former is distinguished by the presence of an actual intent to deceive
while the latter, . . . is characterized
by a breach of a duty arising out of
a fiduciary or confidential relationship."
In Re Guardianship of C. Chandos, 504
P.Zd 524, 526 (Ariz. App. 1972).
See also, In Re Purton's Estate, 441 P.2d 561 (Ariz. App. 1968).
Thus,
"Constructive fraud is a breach of a
legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt, the law declares
fraudulent because of its tendence to
deceive others and violate a confidence
and neither actual dishonesty of purpose
or intent to deceive is necessary."
Loucks v. McCormick, 424 P.2d 555, 559
(Kan. 1967).
Once the breach of a fiduciary duty has been shown, the
burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove that full disclosure
was made and that his conduct was in all particulars honest
and in good faith.

In Re Guardianship of Chandos, supra.

A

director of a corporation occupies a fiduciary relationship
with the corporation and with the corporation's stockholders.
Thus, his personal dealings involving the corporation will be
voided, absent a showing of fairness and good faith.

Branch

v. Western Factors, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 361, 50:L P.2d 570 (1972);
Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 492 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1972).
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I

In the instant case, the Spors issued the stock in Gold
Spor to themselves and to their relatives before they had performed their obligations under the pre-incorporation agreement
to execute the promissory note and transfer Gold Spor shares
to Crested Butte to secure its loan.

This was done without

notice to Crested Butte and without formal action by the board
of directors of Gold Spor.

The Spors later gave only ineffectual

notice of a board meeting of Gold Spor to Crested Butte's representatives on the board, which made their attendance impossible.
The Spors barred Messrs. Larsen and Svilar from the second board
meeting and refused to relate the substance of their agreement
with Candelaria (Larsen Depo. at 54-55).

None of these facts,

or the fact that at the time Paul Spor was a vice-president
and director of Gold Spor, he was also a vice-president of Candelaria Metals (a clear conflict of interest) came to light until
after discovery in the instant action was well under way.
The Spors revealed nothing to Crested Butte, which was
legally entitled to 50% of the Gold Spor stock, regarding its
negotiations with Candelaria for the sale of all of the assets
of Gold Spor, a sale of its assets which the Spors must have
considered not to be in the regular course of its business,
as evidenced by the fact that the Spors attempted to comply
with the requirements of Section 16-10-74, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended, which in pertinent part states:

-21-

,...

I

"Sale or mortgage of assets other than
in regular course of business.
A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge,
or other disposition of all, or substantially all, the property and assets, with
or without the goodwill, of a corporation,
if not made in the usual and regular
course of its business, may be made
upon such terms and conditions and for
such consideration, which may consist
in whole or in part of money or property,
real or personal, including shares of
any other corporation, domestic or foreign,
as may be authorized in the following
manner:
(a) The board of directors shall
adopt a resolution recommending such
sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge,
or other disposition and directing the
submission thereof to a vote at a meeting
of shareholders, which may be either
an annual or special meeting. .
"
(Emphasis added).
The Spors, as officers and directors of Gold Spor, owed
a fiduciary duty to Gold Spor, to its shareholders (Crested
Butte being entitled to be a 50% shareholder), and to their
fellow directors, Messrs. Evans and Herron, to fully reveal
the details of the Candelaria contract and the details
compensation) of Paul Spor's relationship with Candelaria.
Later discovery has revealed that Paul Spor was being paid $3,00c
per month and as of November 1982 had received a total of
from Candelaria (R.312-313); discovery has also revealed that
Chad Spor was hired as a consultant by Candelaria from
1980 to June 10, 1982 at a rate of $2,000 per month and has
received a total of $42,661.93 from Candelaria (R.311).
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The Spars have offered no justification for their bad-faith
and deceitful conduct which would allow the lower court to determine, as a matter of law, that no fraud or misrepresentation
occurred in the inducement of the alleged accord and satisfaction.
POINT III.
WHETHER THE ARGUENDO "RECISION" AND
"ACCORD AND SATISFACTION" WERE INDUCED
BY FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS IS
A QUESTION OF FACT IMPROPERLY RULED
UPON AS A MATTER OF LAW BY THE LOWER
COURT.
Whether a fiduciary relationship has been abused depends
on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
Re

Estate of Ewers, 481 P.2d 970 (Kan. 1971).

In

In this case,

as shown above, whether there has been such an abuse is both
a controverted and material question of fact.
Summary judgment can be granted only if the moving party
carries his burden of showing "that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.

The burden

of proof is upon the moving party to show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact.

This court has set forth the

standard for a motion of this type, saying:
"On a motion for summary judgment against
a defendant, where some of the facts
are in dispute, a judgment can properly
be entered against a defendant only
if, on the undisputed facts, the defendant
has no valid defense; if then anr material
fact is asserted by the plaintif is
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contradicted by the defendant, the facts
as stated b the defendant must, on
sue motion, e taken as true.
Emphasis
added). Disabled American Veterans
v. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d
416, 417 (1959).
As to what is a "genuine issue", nothing more is required
than that, viewing all reasonable doubts and inferences in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is a factual
dispute between them as to a material issue.
Federal Practice & Procedure §2725 at 510.

10 Wright & Miller.
As to what satisfies

the requirement of "any material fact," means only that as to
the fact or facts in dispute, "their existence or non-existence
might effect the result of the action . .
(emphasis supplied).

II

..!_£., §2725 at 506-o;

Finally, the court is not called upon

to decide credibility questions in a summary judgment proceeding
I

Any questions of credibility which may arise by reason of contr• I
dictory depositions, affidavits or evidence are issues for trial

..!_£., §2713 at 406.
This Court should apply the same standard as a trial
court in determining whether the record presents a genuine issue
of material fact.

Durham v. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332, 1334 (Utah

1977); Hunter v. Farmers Ins. Group, 554 P.2d 1239 (Wyo. 1976)
On summary judgment, the sole inquiry is whether a material
issue of fact exists, not to decide it.

W. M. Barnes Co. v.

Sohio Nat. Res. Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981).

A "material issue

of fact" is one whose existence or non-existence
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. . affects the outcome of the litigation and
requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing
versions of the truth."
Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th
Cir. 1982).

Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981).

only when it is evident that

view of the undisputed

facts that the resisting party could not prevail, "is the court
justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting
his evidence and attempting to persuade the trier of fact to
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

his views.
1975).

In summary judgment proceedings, all questions of credi-

bility are issues for trial.
(Utah 1974).

Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620

In the 1 ight of these standards, defendant respect-

fully contends that the lower court's judgment must be reversed
and the case remanded for trial.

In the instant case, there

remain material issues of fact as to whether there was a meeting
of the minds that repayment of the loan by Gold Spor would,
in light of the circumstances, work an accord and satisfaction
to release the Spors individually from the other provisions
of the pre-incorporation contract having nothing to do with
the loan.

Further, even if, arguendo there was a recision of

the contract, the Spors' deceitful conduct in failing to disclose the details of their relationship with Candelaria and
their other breaches of fiduciary duty must be passed upon by
the trier of fact to determine if these deceptions contributed
to cause Crested Butte to accept the recision.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully suggests that the lower court
erred in ruling as a matter of law on the material facts in
question without due consideration of the conflicting evidence
as to the intent and conduct of the parties regarding the issues
of recision, accord and satisfaction, and fraud.

The court

in effect erroneously held that because Crested Butte was aware
of some of the misdeeds of the Spors at the time it cashed the
checks in question, that it knew all the details and the full
implications of such misdeeds, which it did not.

The extent

of the Spors' complicity came to light only during the discovery
conducted in this action.

Additionally, the lower court erred

in failing to recognize the severability of Crested Butte's
right to receive repayment of the liquidated loan vis-a-vis
its right to a 50% interest in Gold Spor, whatever that might
be.
In light of the record and authorities set forth above,
appellant contends that the case should be remanded for trial
on the merits with respect to the remaining issues regarding
the rights and duties of the parties under the pre-incorporation
contract.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of November, 1983.

H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
R. L. KNUTH
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, two
copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Earl Jay Peck,
Esq., NIELSEN & SENIOR, P. 0. Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah
84147, counsel for Plaintiffs-Respondents; and to Robert H.
Wilde, Esq., 2641 South 3270 West, Salt Lake City, Utah

84119,

counsel for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent, this

day

of November, 1983.

Of Appellant's Counsel
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